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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
SURCHARGING EXECUTORS FOR DEPRECIATION
OF SECURITIES IN MARGIN ACCOUNT-GOLDS-
BOROUGH, ET AL. V. DE WITT, ET AL. 1
The testator died July 23, 1930 leaving a will which
named as executors his friends and legal advisers, the two
defendants-appellees. The will stated that no bond was
to be required and gave wide discretionary powers to the
executors. The executors were members of a New York
law firm doing a great deal of trust and administration
work. They qualified on August 5 in the Orphans' Court
of Talbot County. Inventory and appraisements were re-
turned on September 3 and showed the chief asset of the
estate to be securities, valued as of the date of the testator's
death at $552,000 (in round figures). The major portion
of these securities was in a margin account in a New York
brokerage house, where the account was $426,000 against
which there were pledged securities, leaving the estate an
equity of $234,000. The testator had also owned unpledged
securities worth $89,000 which were later sold and the pro-
ceeds applied to the reduction of the broker's debt. (There
was also in the estate considerable other personal property
and valuable realty, the administration of which was in-
volved in the case. This comment will be confined, how-
ever, to a discussion of the securities.) The estate was
comfortably solvent. Upon application of the executors,
the Orphans' Court granted numerous extensions of time
for selling the securities.
The executor's petitions alleged the need for doing this
"because of the business depression now existing through-
out the country . . .", and expressed the hope "that with
the betterment of business conditions, which your petition-
ers are hopeful will occur in the next few months . . .",
that there would be a rise in the value of the securities.
Aside from these petitions and orders of court thereon, no
accounting was filed until June 21, 1934. The final account-
ing was made in May, 1935, and revealed a depreciation of
value in the securities of $295,000. The margin account
had been carried all this time with frequent calls for more
margin and at one point had been saved by large guaranty
accounts opened by the executors individually.
After losing in the Court of Appeals' on the question of
whether issues could be sent to a jury, the widow (who had
1189 A. 226 (Md. 1937).
2Goldsborough, et al. v. De Witt, et al., 169 Md. 463, 182 A. 324 (1936).
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renounced the will) and the beneficiaries filed exceptions to
the Administration Account and attempted inter alia to sur-
charge the executors for the depreciation of the securities.
The Orphans' Court overruled the exceptions and this ap-
peal was taken. Held, Affirmed. Where records of the
Orphans' Court disclosed granting of extensions, but the
testamentary beneficiaries took no action until May, 1935,
lapse of time and laches precluded them from now question-
ing the authority of the court to grant such extensions, even
though granted as ex parte orders, but not procured by
fraud, deceit, or mistake. Measure of executors' duty in
determining when and what securities to sell was to act in
good faith and due diligence with same degree of care as
a reasonably and ordinarily prudent man would exercise
in handling his own similar affairs. The executors could
carry on the margin account for the purpose of realization
of the value of the securities.
The problem presented by this case arises frequently
after an economic crisis.' The decedent leaves investments
-when should the executors (or administrators) sell? It
is submitted that the courts are torn between two under-
lying policies: first, the executor's primary duty to pre-
serve the asssets of the estate, entailing a high degree of
fiduciary responsibility ;' second, the apparent injustice of
holding liable one who has acted as an ordinarily prudent
man according to the customs and beliefs of the time.
Since the courts recognize that decisions in this type of
case depend largely on the particular facts and circum-
stances involved,5 it is difficult to formulate any general
principles. The duty of an executor to sell goods of a per-
'Calling in Confederate securities In southern states, Tompkins v. Tomp-
kins, 18 S. C. 1 (1882) ; Involving railroad stock that depreciated in panic
in 1873, Matter of Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883) ; Depreciation following the
World War, In re Varet's Estate, 181 App. Div. 446, 168 N. Y. S. 896
(1918) ; "Presents the frequently recurring situation arising out of the
present financial depression", In re Chaves' Estate, 143 Misc. 868, 257 N.
Y. S. 641, 642 (1932).
' "The purposes of administration are to collect the assets of the dece-
dent, pay his debts and funeral expenses, etc. and make distribution to the
persons entitled thereto. But administration includes more than this; it
involves all that may be done rightfully in the preservation of the assets,
and all which may be done legally by the administrator in his dealings with
creditors, distributees, legatees, or which may be done by them in securing
their right . . .", 23 C. J. 997. "In making investments of the funds of the
estate the representative acts as trustee rather than as executor or admin-
istrator and his duties and liabilities In respect to such investments are
governed by the same rules as apply to other trustees.", 24 C. J. 72.
5"The special and distinctive facts In each proceeding must determine
the liability or exoneration of the particular fiduciary", In re Sprong's
Estate, 144 Misc. 293, 259 N. Y. S. 77, 80 (1932).
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ishable nature is clear.' However, whether securities or
more especially stocks owned on margin, come within the
meaning of perishable goods is a debatable point.7 It has
been stated that "an administrator or an executor in the
absence of express authority therefor, is not permitted to
use any part of the estate in trade, or manufacturing, or
stock speculation, or other business venture, whereby the
trust fund is put at hazard; and the doing by him of any of
these things has generally been regarded as a breach of
trust and a devastavit"' and yet the courts as a general rule
have declined to surcharge executors for losses occasioned
by failure to close out non-margin accounts, when they were
acting with due care, good faith, and with a view to the best
interests of the estate,9 even though in some cases the losses
have been stupendous. It has been held that good faith,
due diligence, etc., may be evidenced by seeking the advice
0 Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators, Vol. 2, Sec. 1325a and
ff.; Md. Code, Art. 93, Secs. 291, 292.
"Statute covering sale of perishable goods held not to include margin
account, Off v. Russell, et al., 60 P. (2d) 331 (Calif. 1936) ; nor to include
"all property subject to market fluctuation", In re Fisher's Estate, 128 Iowa
626, 104 N. W. 1023, 1024 (1905) ; no difference between those held outright
and those held as collateral, In re McKee's Estate, 147 Misc. 889, 265 N.
Y. S. 47 (1933) ; trustees could invest in mortgage "participations" under
New York Banking Law, In re Flint's Will, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N. Y. S.
470 (1934); investments in Montgomery Ward, Radio, Union Carbide,
National City Bank, etc., considered not speculative, but "seasoned" and
"good Moody ratings", In re Winburn's Will, 140 Misc. Rep. 18, 249 N. Y. S.
758 (1931).
On the other hand: See especially: In re Busby's Estate, 6 N. E. (2d)
451 (Ill. App. 1937), decided by the Appellate Court of Illinois, and which
may, therefore, be appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois. This case
emphasizes more strongly than any other recent one the dangerous nature
of a margin account, and apparently places a higher degree of responsi-
bility on the executor than the principal case, since it rejects the doctrine
of what a reasonable man would do handling his own affairs in favor of
the doctrine of what a reasonable man would do in handling the property
of another. See also: "Common prudence required that such a speculative
account be closed out at earliest practicable moment", In re Hirsch's Estate,
101 N. Y. S. 893; an estate consisting mostly of common stocks termed
"exclusively speculative", In re Stumpp's Estate, 153 Misc. 92, 274 N. Y. S.
466 (1934) ; Margin account considered as speculative, Appeal of Matthew's,
76 Conn. 654, 57 A. 694 (1904) ; duty to withdraw from marginal trading
account, In re Disbrow's Estate, 145 Misc. 584, 261 N. Y. S. 635 (1932).
11 R. C. L. p. 136.
o See: Matter of Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883) ; In re Clark's Will, 257
N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; In re Winburn's Will, 140 Misc. Rep. 18,
249 N. Y. S. 758 (1931) ; In re Chaves' Estate, 143 Misc. 868, 257 N. Y. S.
641 (1932) ; In re Kent's Estate, 146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. S. 698 (1932) ;
In re Andrew's Estate, 239 App. Div. 82, 265 N. Y. S. 386 (1933); U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Greer, 29 Ariz. 203, 240 P. 343 (1925) ; In re
Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416, 167 A. 597 (1933) ; In re Megaree's Estate,
117 N. J. E. 347, 175 A. 808 (1934) ; In re Cross' Estate, 176 A. 101, 117 N.
J. E. 429 (195).
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of recognized men of affairs or business leaders, ° by set-
tlement of the estate within a reasonable time" or by acting
as would an ordinarily industrious and prudent man in the
conduct of his own affairs. 2 On the other hand, evidence
of undue regard for one class of beneficiaries,"3 or domi-
nance of a personal interest of the executor's, 4 or gross
delinquency in settling the estate 5 may lead the court to
find such negligence as to warrant surcharging the execu-
tor. Another factor involved is the weight to be given
to the fact that the decedent bought the stocks.' It is clear
that there is a difference between speculative buying and
mere retention of securities 7 (which may even be "non-
legals" according to the statutory law for trustees in the
particular jurisdiction). The court may consider the ex-
ecutor's retention of investments, which ordinarily an ex-
ecutor could not make, as the "result of exercise of their
sound judgment", while other authorities will declare that
the situation was such as to make it "the duty of an ex-
ecutor or administrator to make changes in the investments
in order to render them more secure . ..and thereby with-
draw the securities from such perilous business". Mar-
ketability is another question which may influence the
court; it is recognized that unlisted stocks or those in a
closed corporation may require more time to liquidate than
the more familiar shares which are traded daily.2" It has
been contended that trust companies and others who hold
10 People's National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bichler, 115 N. J. E. 617, 172
A. 207 (1934) ; In re Clark's Will, supra note 9; In re Booth's Estate, 264
N. Y. S. 773 (1933) (but surcharged Trust Company acting as executor for
failure to sell after its own trust committee had advised sale of the
particular stocks).
11 One year, In re Andrew's Estate and In re Winburn's Estate, supra
note 9.121 In re Kent's Estate; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Greer, and In re
Cross Estate, supra note 9; In re McCafferty's Will, 147 Misc. 179, 264
N. Y. S. 38 (1933).18 In re Andrew's Estate, 239 App. Div. 32, 265 N. Y. S. 386 (1933).
1' In re Stumpp's Estate, 153 Misc. 92, 274 N. Y. S. 466 (1934).1 5 In re Junkersfeld's Estate, 244 App. Div. 260, 279 N. Y. S. 481 (1935).
Emphasis is sometimes put on the decedent's apparent faith in the
particular stocks. See In re McKee's Estate, 147 Misc. 889, 265 N. Y. S.
47 (1933) where decedent had been a "specialist" in the stock involved.
17 In re Clark's Will, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; In re Kent's
Estate, 146 Misc. 155, 261 N. Y. S. 698 (1932).
Is In re Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416, 167, A. 597, 600 (1933). See also
In re Bernheimer's Estate, 106 Misc. Rep. 719, 175 N. Y. S. 594 (1919) ; In
re Chaves' Estates, 143 Misc. 868, 257 N. Y. S. 641 (1932).
19 11 R. C. L. 143-144. See also Appeal of Matthews, 76 Conn. 654, 57 A.
694 (1904) ; In re Disbrow's Estate, 145 Misc. 584, 261 N. Y. S. 635 (1932)
In re Busby's Estate, 6 N. E. (2d) 451 (Ill. App.1937).90 In re Yund's Estate, 152 Misc. 785, 274 N. Y. S. 831 (1934). -
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themselves out as experts in administration of estates and
have available superior facilities should be held accountable
for a higher degree of care and diligence than individual
executors and trustees ;21 but another case2" declared that
the creation of such a distinction was a legislative function.
Naturally, the terms of the will have a bearing on the lati-
tude of discretionary power which is to be allowed the ex-
ecutor without incurring liability.3 Another factor which
frequently plays an important part is whether or not the
beneficiaries have become estopped to question the action
of the executors. Of course, a direct and unsolicited ap-
proval of the executor's plans should, and will prevent the
beneficiaries from later objecting, when later developments
prove the judgment to have been disastrously mistaken.
Consultation with the beneficiaries has been held to nega-
tive liability on the part of the executors," as also has the
continued acquiescence of the beneficiaries." But in one
case27 the court used the following language: "Such in-
quiries (as to the course of administration) expose the bene-
ficiaries to no liability whatever. They do not involve the
beneficiary in the estate administration, and this is so even
if there be an expression of viewpoint by the beneficiary.
It is only where there is an absolute assumption by the
beneficiary of the fiduciary's function, under conditions
which on general legal principles impose responsibility for
the result, that a fiduciary should be permitted to defend
the failures of his administration by charging them to the
beneficiary. Any other administrative policy would be sure
to result in grave harm. A lowering of the bars of this
2l (1931) 5 University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1, 26, 51; "Holding itself
out as a specialist in trust affairs it should be held to a high degree of care",
In re Cross' Estate, 115 N. J. E. 611, 172 A. 212, 214 (1934) (Reversed but
no criticism of this statement in 117 N. J. E. 429, 176 A. 101 (1935).
" In re Flint's Will, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N. Y. S. 470 (1934).
23 See: Matter of Weston, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883) where the will provided
that certain stocks were "to be held firmly"; and In re Cross' Estate, 117
N. J. E. 429, 176 A. 101 (1935), where a provision allowing executor to
borrow up to a certain amount to keep from selling at an unfavorable time
was considered to warrant holding on to the stock.
21 Where he has acted in good faith and "his course of conduct has been
requested, authorized, or assented to by the heirs or distributees, with
knowledge of all the material facts, this may excuse him from any liability
to them for resulting losses, even though he has deviated from the line of
his duties", 24 C. J. 127-128.
25 In re Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416, 167 A. 597 (1933).
2" In re Clark's Will, 257 N. Y. 132. 177 N. E. 397 (1931) ; People's Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co. v. Bichler, 115 N. J. E. 617, 172 A. 207 (1934).
" In re Pinney's Estate, 156 Misc. 844, 282 N. Y. S. 680. 690 (1935).
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type of defense would undoubtedly result in escape from
liability by unfaithful fiduciaries. 128
In the principal case the court worked out estoppel from
various conferences, letters of approval (although for the
most part solicited by the executors after the stocks had
been retained for some time), and from the fact that the
records of the Orphans' Court with the petition and orders
thereon were always open to the beneficiaries.a Since the
beneficiaries had not objected to the course of conduct until
the filing of the administration account in May, 1935, it was
held that their silence and failure to object worked an es-
toppel. It is submitted that the amount of control which
in practice executors have over the entire estate, the in-
formality of ex parte proceedings before the Orphans'
Courts, and the great reliance of both court and beneficiary
upon the executors, when considered from a practical view-
point and not from legalistic reasoning, make this principle
one which should be carefully limited. Perhaps, as in the
instant case, it should be used as an additional factor in
exonerating executors otherwise free from fault, but it
should certainly never be used as the sole ground for
denying surcharge where the executors have dealt negli-
gently or in bad faith with the funds. It is also submitted
that more responsibility should attach in the case of margin
accounts than in the case of stocks owned outright, for the
danger of total loss is more imminent-in only three cases29
where the executors were not surcharged for alleged delay
in liquidating securities were margin accounts involved.
On the whole, it seems that the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals has followed the general tendency to relieve from
liability executors who have acted in good faith, with due
diligence, and with the best interest of the estate in mind.
It must be remembered that ordinarily executors would
have nothing to gain personally by an extended adminis-
28 See also In re Stumpp's Estate, 153 Misc. 92, 274 N. Y. S. 466 (1934)
(silence does not estop beneficiaries) ; In re Frame's Estate, 245 App. Div.
675, 284 N. Y. S. 153 (1935) (inquiries not an estoppel, nor does mere
silence show acquiescence as beneficiaries have a right to assume that
executors are acting legally).
"
8
a In view of the impossibility of appealing from the (non-final) orders
of the Orphans' Court which authorized the continuance of the margin
account it would seem improper to predicate an estoppel against the bene-
ficiaries. On the other hand, the Court's interpretation can be justified on
the basis that the beneficiaries did not object to the executors' course of
conduct in the Orphans' Court itself.
29 In re McKee's Estate, 147 Misc. 889, 265 N. Y. S. 47 (1933); In re
Lazar's Estate, 189 Misc. Rep. 261, 247 N. Y. S. 230 (1030) Peck v. Searle,
117 Conn. 578, 169 A. 602 (1934).
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tration period. And also it should be remembered that it
is all too easy to criticize after the results have occurred.
And yet, the fiduciary capacity of an executor should lead
the courts to restrict the tendency. Since the executor is
dealing, not as an adult with his own money, but as a trus-
tee on behalf of beneficiaries, who only too frequently are
entirely dependent on the preservation of the estate for
their futures, too much weight should not be given to the
fact that the deceased made the original investments. The
defense of estoppel should be carefully scrutinized to see
if the executors actually relied on the consent or advice of
the beneficiaries. It should appear convincingly that the
executors recognized the danger of total loss involved in
margin accounts and that they were actually trying to
realize the assets and not trying to speculate. Executors
should be made to realize that the burden of responsibility
can easily be shifted by seeking consent of court and bene-
ficiaries upon a full disclosure of the situation.
